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NOTE
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AND DUE PROCESS:
JUSTIFYING "REVENUE-RAISING" MODERN ESCHEAT
Teagan J. Gregory*
States have long claimed the right to take custody of presumably aban-
doned property and hold it for the benefit of the true owner under the
doctrine of escheat. In the face of increasing fiscal challenges, states have
worked to increase their collection of unclaimed property via new escheat
legislation that appears to bear little or no relation to protecting the inter-
ests of owners. Holders of unclaimed property have raised substantive due
process challenges in response to these modern escheat statutes. This Note
contends that two categories of these disputed laws-those shortening
dormancy periods and those allowing states to estimate a holder's un-
claimed property liability in the absence of creditor records-are logically
consistent with the legitimate state interest in reuniting owners with their
abandoned property and therefore do not violate due process.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 320
I. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO "REVENUE-RAISING"
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAWS .................................................. 322
A. The Due Process Challenge: American Express ............... 324
B. Looking for the Proper Rationale ...................................... 326
II. THE REVENUE-RAISING JUSTIFICATION PROBLEM ................... 327
III. THE PROPERTY INTEREST JUSTIFICATION PROBLEM ................ 331
A. Three Property Interest Theories ....................................... 332
B. Common Holder-Owner Relationships Create a
Property Interest for the Holder ........................................ 334
C. A Holder's Property Interest in Unclaimed
Property Is Extinguished upon Abandonment ................... 336
IV. THE REUNIFICATION ANSWER ................................................. 337
A. The Financial Security Connection ................................... 338
B. The Early Notification Connection .................................... 340
C. The Common Holder Connection ...................................... 342
D. The Record-Keeping Connection ....................................... 343
C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................... 344
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012. I am grateful to my note editors, Sada Jacobson Baby
and Rebecca Klein, for their thoughtful input; to Professor William Miller for his insight and
advice; and to Brenda Mayrack and Michael Houghton for providing the inspiration for this
Note. Finally, I thank my parents and my wife for their support.
Michigan Law Review
INTRODUCTION
What do Mick Jagger, Ben Bernanke, Steve Jobs, and the New York
Yankees have in common? The State of California is holding lost money
that belongs to each of them.' In fact, the same is true of approximately
eight million individuals and businesses in that state.' Lest one think that
this is a situation peculiar to the Golden State, the numbers are similarly
impressive on the East Coast-Delaware alone expects to collect over $400
million in unclaimed property in 2012 3-and on a national scale.4 From the
child who forgets to spend a gift card received several birthdays ago to the
employee who never gets around to cashing her final paycheck, unclaimed
property can spring up nearly anywhere, and surprisingly little ever makes
its way back into the hands of its owners.5 How is such a system possible?
Understanding how states have come to collect such large sums of money
requires some basic knowledge of what precisely unclaimed property is.
Unclaimed property may be described as accounts or items held by one
party (the "holder") but belonging to a second party (the "owner") who has
not acted to exercise control over the accounts or items for some extended
period of time.6 Such property can take the form of inactive bank accounts,
uncashed payroll or dividend checks, stocks, travelers checks, and even un-
redeemed gift cards and refunds.7 Though the relevant statutes vary, all
states8 claim the right to consider property "abandoned" after it has been
dormant for some period of time (the "dormancy period"), 9 to seize this
1. Tom Bemis, Jobs, Jolie and Jagger on Who's Who of Dead Money, MARKETWATCH
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.cor/story/whos-who-in-dead-money-2011-02-10.
2. Scott Thurm & Pui-Wing Tam, States Scooping up Assets from Millions of Ameri-
cans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2008, at Al.
3. See Chad Livengood, Revenue Recovering to Tune of $155 million, NEWS J. (Wil-
mington, Del.), Mar. 19, 2011 (noting that Delaware's "new estimate for 2012 shows revenue
from abandoned property breaking the $390 million [mark] by $35 million").
4. See Thurm & Tam, supra note 2.
5. See id. ("On average, states identify owners and return about one-third of [un-
claimed] property.").
6. What is Unclaimed Property?, NAT'L Ass'N UNCLAIMED PROP. ADMINISTRATORS,
http://www.unclaimed.org/what/ (last visited May 15, 2011).
7. Id. (listing also trust distributions, unredeemed money orders, insurance payments
or refunds and life insurance policies, annuities, certificates of deposit, customer overpay-
ments, utility security deposits, mineral royalty payments, and contents of safe deposit boxes).
8. All states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
unclaimed property laws. Id. This Note will often reference the Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act of 1995, since it has been adopted in fifteen states and the U.S. Virgin Islands and has
been introduced in Mississippi. Legislative Fact Sheet, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.nccusl.org/LegistativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Unclaimed%20Property%2OAct (last
visited May 15, 2011). Its 1981 predecessor was enacted in twenty-seven states. Why States
Should Adopt UUPA, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title
=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UUPA (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1198(1) (2007 & Supp. 2010); Ky. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 393.090 (West 2010); UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995) § 2(a), 8C U.L.A. 102
(2001). The dormancy period varies depending on the state and the type of property in ques-
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abandoned property, and to hold it in a custodial capacity for the benefit of
the true owner ("modem escheat"). 10 However, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a state's ability to interfere with pri-
vate property," and some courts have expressed skepticism over the
constitutionality of certain unclaimed property statutes that appear to be
focused more on generating revenue ("revenue-raising statutes") 2 than on
returning the property to its actual owners ("reunification"). 3
This Note contends that two categories of revenue-raising statutes do not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they
are logically related to the government interest in reunification. These two
categories are (1) those statutes that shorten dormancy periods, accelerating
a state's collection of unclaimed property, 4 and (2) those statutes that permit
a state to estimate a holder's unclaimed property liability incurred over a
longer period of time by sampling a shorter period. 5 Part I introduces the
tion. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1198-99, 1201 (dormancy period of five years for
categories of property not specified, fifteen years for travelers checks, and three years for
securities-related property); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.020, .060, .064, .090 (dormancy peri-
od of three years for categories of intangible property not specified, seven years for travelers
checks, and three years for securities-related property); UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 2, 8C
U.L.A. 102-03 (dormancy period of five years for categories of property not specified, fifteen
years for travelers checks, and five years for securities-related property).
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1206; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.140; UNIF.
UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT §§ 4, 16 & cmt., 8C U.L.A. 111-12, 132. Modern escheat may en-
compass both personal and real property, see infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, and is
generally custodial in nature, see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of ...
property, without due process of law....").
12. This Note uses the term "revenue-raising statutes" to mean those unclaimed proper-
ty laws for which the connection to reunification is not immediately apparent. However, as
this Note contends, some of these statutes are logically consistent with the legitimate govern-
ment interest in reunification. See infra Part IV. The term is not meant to imply that the intent
of the legislatures enacting such statutes was necessarily to generate revenue.
13. See, e.g., Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Cali-
fornia's practice of liquidating unclaimed property almost immediately after taking custody
likely failed to satisfy the notice requirements of due process and merited an injunction); Am.
Express Travel Related Servs. v. Hollenbach (Am. Express 1), 630 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764 (E.D.
Ky. 2009).
14. For example, Kentucky now utilizes a seven-year dormancy period for travelers
checks. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.060(2). Prior versions of the statute allowed a fifteen-year
period. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 393.060(2) (2007). Since states take custody of aban-
doned property and property is only deemed abandoned when a full dormancy period has run,
see supra note 9 and accompanying text, lowering dormancy periods has the effect of acceler-
ating the presumption of abandonment and therefore state collection of this property.
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1155; UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 20, 8C
U.L.A. 137. These laws allow a state to determine how much total unclaimed property a hold-
er possesses despite the absence of records actually demonstrating this liability. See infra note
45. A state may estimate the larger amount of unclaimed property owed based on the subset of
a holder's records that are still available. See id. With regard to this second category, this Note
specifically references title 12, section 1155 of the Delaware Code, since it was recently en-
acted and because Delaware's status as a preferred state of incorporation makes its use of
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concept of escheat, notes the significance of revenue-raising unclaimed
property laws, and details a recent holder-initiated substantive due process
challenge to such an escheat statute, which has raised the specter of chal-
lenges to similar unclaimed property laws. Part II considers and dismisses
one potential justification for such laws. It concludes that courts should
avoid simply characterizing escheat statutes as revenue-raising mechanisms,
since these laws are unable to satisfy the due process requirements applied
to tax statutes and because such characterization risks undermining public
trust in the legislative process. Part III considers and partially dismisses an-
other potential justification-that holders, as debtors and not actual owners,
do not have the recognized property interest in escheated funds necessary
even to raise a due process claim. It contends that holders often do have
such a property interest but notes that this interest may sometimes be extin-
guished prior to escheat. Finally, Part IV argues that courts should
nevertheless uphold revenue-raising escheat laws, as they are rationally re-
lated to the legitimate government interest in reuniting owners with their
abandoned property.
I. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO "REVENUE-RAISING"
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAWS
Escheat was traditionally understood as the "[r]eversion of proper-
ty... to the state upon the death of an owner who has neither a will nor
any legal heirs."' 6 The concept has its roots in Roman law, under which an
officer would be appointed to assert the right of the emperor to a dece-
dent's estate when that decedent left no heirs to claim it.'7 In England, the
idea was incorporated into the feudal land system, which was itself built
on the proposition that the sovereign was the original grantor of real prop-
erty and therefore had at least an indirect interest in all land.' 8 Escheat fit
into this structure as the means by which land would revert to the sover-
eign when a person with fee simple estate in land died without identifiable
heirs.' 9 In America, the concept of escheat, which applied solely to real
property, and the analogous theory of bona vacantia, which applied to per-
estimation particularly likely to generate large amounts of unclaimed property to which the
state has little or no connection. See infra note 32.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (9th ed. 2009).
17. JAMES KENT, 4 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 425 (John M. Gould ed., 14th
ed. 1896).
18. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *53 ("The grand and fundamental max-
im of all feudal tenure is this: that all lands were originally granted out by the sovereign, and
are therefore holden, either mediately or immediately, of the crown.").
19. John V. Orth, Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 73, 75 (2009)
("If no heir was immediately identifiable, a legal officer held a proceeding known as an in-
quest of office to determine if the property had escheated, that is, reverted to the Crown 'from
defect of heirs' (propter defectum sanguinis)."). Escheat could also occur through attainder
when the possessor of a fee simple was convicted of a serious crime and lost the ability to
devise property. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *245-46 ("propter delictum tenentis").
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sonal property,2" eventually merged2 and expanded. They were codified in
various state statutes. 22
Modern escheat is a vastly different legal form but provides a similar
practical benefit to the state. Today, most unclaimed property laws allow
the government to seize abandoned property and hold it for the benefit of
the true owner in a custodial capacity rather than passing title to the crown
or state upon an owner's death.23 However, this caretaking relationship
does not erase the government's ability to profit from the abandonment of
property. In fact, states stand to gain from even custodial escheat in several
ways. Though state governments hold approximately $33 billion in un-
claimed property,24 only a fraction of this amount is returned to its actual
owners annually.25 Recognizing this low rate of reunification, many states
simply deposit the collected property into their general funds, in some
cases retaining a minimal amount in a separate trust account to address
owners' claims. 26 Additionally, some states benefit from those funds that
20. Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1326
(1961).
21. See Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 497 n.9 (1993) ("Our opinions ... have
understood 'escheat' as encompassing the appropriation of both real and personal property,
and we use the term in that broad sense."); Note, supra note 20, at 1327 ("American escheat
statutes make no distinction between bona vacantia and escheat and are applicable to realty
and personalty alike .... Modem statutes thus perform dual functions, continuing the tradi-
tions of both bona vacantia and common law escheat.").
22. See Note, supra note 20, at 1330. A detailed history of unclaimed property law is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally id. and MICHAEL HOUGHTON ET AL., UN-
CLAIMED PROPERTY (Corp. Practice Series Portfolio 74-2nd, 2009), § 1I, A-3 to -6 (Sept.
2009), for more thorough descriptions of escheat's origins and evolution.
23. See, e.g., UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995) § 16 & cmt., 8C U.L.A. 132 (2001).
The idea of "custodial" escheat is somewhat contradictory, since escheat was historically un-
derstood to pass full title to the sovereign. Several modern unclaimed property statutes,
however, use the term "escheat" and this Note likewise understands the term to carry its mod-
em custodial definition.
24. What is Unclaimed Property?, supra note 6.
25. E.g., Thurm & Tam, supra note 2 (noting that in 2006 states collected about $5.1
billion in unclaimed property but returned just $1.75 billion to owners). For reasons discussed
below, see infra note 32, the numbers are even more striking for preferred states of incorpora-
tion such as Delaware, which capture disproportionately large amounts of unclaimed property
and remit even lower percentages to owners. See Randall Chase, Delaware Among States
Eyeing Unclaimed Property, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 24, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.conap/financialnews/D9JMOU000.htm (noting that abandoned
property is Delaware's third-largest source of revenue and that the state "has taken in more
than $1.7 billion... since 2007 but returned only $46 million, or less than 3 percent").
26. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1564 (West 2011) (requiring that money be put
in abandoned property fund and any amount in excess of $50,000 be transferred to the general
fund each month); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1205(a) (2007) (authorizing the deposit of all
property into the general fund); see also UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 13(a) & cmt., 8C
U.L.A. 127 (recommending that $100,000 be retained in a trust account and the remainder be
deposited in the general fund and noting "that the amount of the trust fund which is ultimately
established will reflect a State's experience in paying owners' claims"). Given this low rate of
reunification, escheated funds could be viewed as "interest-free loans that a state may never be
November 2011 ]
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are eventually remitted by claiming the interest earned while in govern-
ment custody.17
Perhaps understanding the revenue-raising potential of escheat laws, leg-
islatures and state officials have taken steps to increase the collection of
unclaimed property.28 Such efforts have taken the form of both more strin-
gent enforcement of existing statutes29 and the implementation of aggressive
new escheat laws.30 This latter category includes statutes that shorten the
dormancy period that must pass before holders are required to turn over un-
claimed property to the state3' and that authorize estimation of a holder's
escheat liability for years past.32
A. The Due Process Challenge: American Express
A federal district court in Kentucky recently pushed back against ambi-
tious unclaimed property laws, however, seemingly providing a legal
roadmap for holders who would seek to challenge revenue-driven escheat
legislation. In American Express Travel Related Services Co. v. Hollenbach
required to repay." Stephen G. Harris & Phyllis J. Shambaugh, Abbreviated Unclaimed Prop-
erty Dormancy Periods, 3 J. PAYMENT SYSTEMS L. 52, 52 (2007).
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1206(c). While owners have recently chal-
lenged such provisions, they have had little success. See, e.g., Suever V. Connell, 579 F.3d
1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009) (examining California's retention of interest and noting that "the
State is not constitutionally required to pay any interest"); Simon v. Weissmann, 301 F. App'x
107, 114 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that Pennsylvania's retention of interest was not an unconsti-
tutional taking); Cwik v. Giannoulias, 930 N.E.2d 990, 998 (I11. 2010) (similarly holding that
Illinois's retention of interest was not an unconstitutional taking). But see Sogg v. Zurz, 905
N.E.2d 187, 192-93 (Ohio 2009) (holding that Ohio's retention of interest violated the state's
constitution).
28. Harris & Shambaugh, supra note 26, at 52; Robert Peters, Tax Revenue Declines
Drive States to Eye Unclaimed Property, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Sept. 2008, at 54, 54-55.
29. Harris & Shambaugh, supra note 26, at 52 ("By increasing enforcement of the
unclaimed property laws already on the books, states are often able to generate increased
revenues ... ."); Peters, supra note 28, at 54-55; see also Chase, supra note 25 (noting that in
2009, for the first time, Delaware collected more unclaimed property through enforcement
actions than from regular collections).
30. Timothy R. McTaggart & Monica 0. Frazer, Escheat: Are Significant Legal Chang-
es--and Potential Liability-Ahead?, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES, Mar.-Apr. 2003,
at 15, 17, available at 2003 WL 872362 ("[W]ith many states facing budget shortfalls, legisla-
tures are looking to revise their escheat laws to capture funds ....").
31. See supra note 14; see also Harris & Shambaugh, supra note 26, at 52 (noting that
Florida, Kentucky, Iowa, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah recently shortened dor-
mancy periods for various types of property).
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1155 (2007 & Supp. 2010) (allowing Delaware
to estimate the amount of unclaimed property that a holder accrued during years for which
that holder does not possess owner records). Under the Supreme Court's priority rules, where
no ownership records exist, the holder's state of incorporation has the right to take custody of
the property. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 681-82 (1965). Accordingly, Delaware may
extrapolate a holder's total unclaimed property liability for years past and often, as a preferred
state of incorporation, may claim the entirety of this amount without evidence that even a
fraction of the true owners have any connection to Delaware.
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(American Express J),33 the district court granted the holder-plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment, determining that a Kentucky statute that
shortened the dormancy period for uncashed travelers checks from fifteen
years to seven years did not satisfy rational basis review under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 In a later opinion denying the
defendant's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, the district court
clarified that "[the statute in question] was not enacted to further a 'legiti-
mate' state interest. Instead, it was enacted to raise revenue for the state. 35
The court thus concluded that, at least in the case of escheat statutes, raising
revenue is not a legitimate interest sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process. While it has long been observed that unclaimed property laws serve
a dual purpose-reunification and providing states with the use of the aban-
doned property36-the district court did not regard the latter function as
independently sufficient.37
In May 2011, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacat-
ed the American Express I decision, holding that Kentucky's shortened
dormancy period did not violate substantive due process and remanding the
case for consideration of the remaining constitutional challenges.38 The
Sixth Circuit emphasized that the district court applied an improperly strict
form of rational basis review and that legislative decisions ought to be ac-
corded greater deference. 39 The appellate court specifically noted that the
33. 630 F Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Ky. 2009), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Travel Related
Servs. Co. v. Kentucky (American Express 111), 641 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2011).
34. Am. Express 1, 630 E Supp. 2d at 764-66. The Kentucky legislature actually enact-
ed a similar statute in 2006. American Express Travel Related Services Co. ("American
Express"), an issuer of travelers checks and a holder of the unclaimed property affected by this
statute, challenged the shortened dormancy period, and a state court struck it down for failing
to meet state notice and publication requirements. Id. at 760. The legislature then passed "vir-
tually the same amendment ... during the next legislative session[,]" and American Express
challenged it as violating the Kentucky Constitution and the Due Process, Contract, and Tak-
ings Clauses of the United States Constitution. Id.
35. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Hollenbach (American Express 11), No. 3:
08-58-DCR, 2009 WL 2382407, at *1 (E.D. Ky. July 30, 2009).
36. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 (1951) ("[P]roperty
thus escapes seizure by would-be possessors and is used for the general good rather than for
the chance enrichment of particular individuals or organizations."); UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP.
ACT (1995) § 20 & cmt., 8C U.L.A. 137 (2001) ("[O]ne of the dual purposes of this Act is the
collection of revenue .... "); Ethan D. Millar & John L. Coalson, Jr., The Pot of Gold at the
End of the Class Action Lawsuit: Can States Claim It as Unclaimed Property?, 70 U. PITT. L.
REV. 511, 516-17 (2009). But see Taylor v. Chiang, No. CIV. S-01-2407 WBS GGH, 2007
WL 1628050, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007) ("If the purpose of the law is ... to reunite own-
ers with their lost or forgotten property, its ultimate goal should be to generate little or no
revenue at all for the state."), vacated, No. CIV. S-01-2407 WBS GGH, 2007 WI 3049645
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007).
37. See Am. Express I1, 2009 WL 2382407, at * 1.
38. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky (American Express II1), 641
F3d 685,694-95 (6th Cir. 2011).
39. Id. at 689-92.
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revenue-raising aspect of the statute did not trigger enhanced scrutiny or
"rational basis with a bite."40
Analyzing the unclaimed property law at issue, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that the statute was rationally related to "facilitat[ing] Kentucky's
interest in assuming possession of abandoned property."4' The precise rea-
soning upon which the appellate court upheld the statute is unclear: the
court indicated that the legitimate state interest necessary to satisfy due pro-
cess was the state's general interest in seizing abandoned property,42 but the
opinion can be read to suggest that revenue generation was also a govern-
ment objective underwriting due process.43 Though this Note will address
both possible rationales, it appears more likely that the Sixth Circuit intend-
ed the former objective alone to satisfy its due process inquiry.'
B. Looking for the Proper Rationale
Unclaimed property laws that provide a financial benefit to the
escheating state but seemingly do not aid in reunification can be cast as
revenue-driven. Such laws include those shortening dormancy periods and
those authorizing the estimation of unclaimed property liability. Laws that
reduce dormancy periods, like the one at issue in the American Express de-
cisions, may appear to be motivated by fiscal concerns because simply
accelerating the transfer of property to the state does not have any obvious
connection to the amount returned to owners. Statutes authorizing estima-
tion of unclaimed property liability seem even more focused on revenue
because the very use of extrapolation implies an absence of records that
would otherwise provide the identities of the owners.45 If the owners are not
known, it seems unlikely that reunification could occur.
40. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that raising revenue is
a legitimate government interest, in contrast to the "improper government objective[s]" at
issue in recent Supreme Court decisions that seemed to apply a more searching form of ra-
tional basis review. Id.
41. Id. at 693.
42. Id. ("Because [facilitating Kentucky's interest in assuming possession of abandoned
property] constitutes a legitimate state purpose and the seven-year presumptive abandonment
period is rationally related to that purpose, the 2008 amendment does not violate substantive
due process guarantees.").
43. See id. at 692 ("[R]evenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose."
(quoting United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
44. The internal structure of the opinion suggests that the court did not intend to frame
revenue generation as the necessary government interest, as its language about revenue gener-
ation falls in a section defining the scope of rational basis review and not in the section
actually applying that standard. See id. This Note, however, also discusses this potential justi-
fication infra in Part II.
45. For example, title 12, section 1155 of the Delaware Code allows the state to esti-
mate the amount of unclaimed property "due and owing on the basis of any available records
of the holder or by any other reasonable method of estimation" when "the records of the hold-
er ... are insufficient to permit the preparation of a report." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1155
(2007 & Supp. 2010). While Delaware generally requires holders to submit records providing
[Vol. 110: 319
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Courts following the district court's approach from American Express I
would invalidate these aggressive laws, while those adopting the appellate
court's view from American Express III would uphold them. Although this
Note argues that the latter result is correct, it further contends that courts
need not rest their decisions upon either of the possible bases for the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion, as these rationales are unclear and inconsistent with
the modem understanding of unclaimed property. Rather, courts confronting
aggressive escheat laws may resolve the problem by determining that such
statutes are, in fact, rationally related to their broadly accepted purpose:
reunification. 6
Before turning attention to American Express Ill's possible grounding in
a state's interest in raising revenue, it should be noted that the Sixth Cir-
cuit's other potential rationale-that a state's interest in assuming
possession of abandoned property is sufficient to underwrite due process-
is problematic. Under highly deferential rational basis review, a legislature
could claim that virtually any unclaimed property law is related to this broad
goal. Unreasonable legislative assumptions about abandonment rates could
justify drastic reductions in dormancy periods. Overbroad methods of esti-
mating unclaimed property liability would stand so long as the legislature
felt they constituted rational means of "correcting the evil" of abandoned
property. Though a state's general interest in taking control of abandoned
property may in fact be a legitimate government objective,47 such reasoning
raises questions as to whether there are any practical substantive due process
limits on state escheat. Moreover, it makes little sense to employ this type of
justification when a far more direct approach is presented by the connection
between even aggressive escheat statutes and reunification. Another ra-
tionale should therefore be advanced to avoid an unnecessarily expansive
reading of state escheat powers.
II. THE REVENUE-RAISING JUSTIFICATION PROBLEM
Though the Sixth Circuit in American Express III reached the proper
conclusion, it may have done so by relying on the revenue-raising aspect of
the statute to provide the legitimate government interest needed to satisfy
rational basis review. This Part argues that courts seeking to resolve the due
process problem should avoid simply characterizing unclaimed property
laws as revenue-generating measures. Such an approach blurs the line
information about owners, id. § 1199, a holder subject to section 1155 will necessarily lack
some of those records, see id. § 1155. Thus, the state takes unclaimed property under section
1155 but lacks the mechanism to identify owners typically provided by section 1199.
46. A New Jersey district court recently employed this general approach in a decision
refusing to enjoin a shortened dormancy period statute. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs.
Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F Supp. 2d 556, 579-81 (D.N.J. 2010) (distinguishing American
Express I as a case in which the court "found conclusively that the only" motivation was reve-
nue).
47. There are older cases that affirm the constitutionality of escheat in broad terms. See,
e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 547 (1948) ("The right of appropriation
by the state of abandoned property has existed for centuries in the common law.").
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between escheat and taxation and may raise questions as to why the former
is not held to the same jurisdictional due process standards. Moreover, a
revenue-centric view is troublesome given the general understanding of
modem unclaimed property laws, which are viewed as consumer-protection
mechanisms.
If a court accepts the proposition that unclaimed property laws are in-
tended to "yield public revenue," there is no principled reason to treat these
measures differently than taxes or to decline to subject them to the same
constitutional restraints of nexus and apportionment. 48 However, escheat
statutes will not be able to clear these twin hurdles under the Supreme
Court's current priority rules in the field of unclaimed property.
In many ways, escheat laws already resemble taxes. They mandate "in-
voluntary payments [by holders] to the state"49 and often employ record
retention, report filing, and audit requirements analogous to those used in
the tax context.50 Based on such similarities, commentators have even sug-
gested that holders utilize a tax professional in their unclaimed property
compliance efforts.5 Given that a tax is "[a] charge, [usually] monetary,
imposed by the government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to
yield public revenue,"5 2 a claim that escheat laws are also intended to raise
revenue only further blurs the line between the two. Since the determination
of whether a monetary assessment constitutes a "tax" rests on an examina-
tion of that assessment's form and purpose, 53 even state actions that are not
explicitly labeled "taxes" may be treated as such by the federal courts. Thus,
it could be argued that escheat laws intended to raise revenue should be re-
garded as taxes and analyzed under the corresponding constitutional tests.5 4
However, the due process analysis applied to taxation conflicts with the ju-
risdictional priority rules for unclaimed property discussed below.55
48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
49. Ethan D. Millar, Overview of State and Local Taxation, in TAX LAW & PRACTICE
891, 940 (PLI Corp. Tax Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 19890, 2009).
50. See HOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 22, at A-43.
51. See id.
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (9th ed. 2009).
53. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367 (1998) (noting that "we must
regard things rather than names" in determining whether to classify a harbor maintenance tax
as an actual tax (quoting Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1875)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1884)
(holding that a federal statute requiring ship owners entering U.S. ports to pay a fee for every
immigrant aboard was not a tax because the proceeds did not go to "the general support of the
government" and were used to regulate immigration).
54. Courts have been hesitant to classify escheat as a tax, see, e.g., Am. Petrofina Co. of
Tex. v. Nance, 859 F.2d 840, 841 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "characterization of [Okla-
homa's unclaimed property law] as a tax measure is incorrect"), but "[w]hen a state raises
revenue from intangible property, no principled reason exits to distinguish due process re-
quirements because the form of raising revenue is labeled tax or escheat," Suellen M. Wolfe,
Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment: A Bright Line Test to Slice a Shadow, 27 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 173, 176 (1995).
55. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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State taxes are subject to a two-prong test, which asks first whether there
is a nexus between the taxpayer and the taxing state and second whether a
rational relationship between the portion of the tax base being pursued and
the intrastate activities of the taxpayer exists.56 From this second require-
ment springs the concept of apportionment, which requires fair division of
the tax base "among the various states providing protection and services to
the taxpayer."
5 7
In contrast to the idea of apportionment, under the priority rules of un-
claimed property, a state may seek all such property owed to creditors
whose last known addresses fall within its borders and, when there is no
recorded address, all abandoned property held by a debtor incorporated in
that state.5 8 The jurisdiction enjoyed by escheat laws thus extends far be-
yond that of state tax laws, which means that escheat laws may fail to satisfy
the second prong of the tax statute due process test. For example, under the
priority rules a state may claim the right to escheat all abandoned property
held by one of its corporations59 when the addresses of that corporation's
creditors are unknown.60 If a state were to exercise this priority right and a
court then were to ask whether the law conformed to the requirements im-
posed on taxes-specifically whether the "tax" base drawn upon was
proportional to the holder's activities within the state-the escheat would
face jurisdictional problems. While providing a corporate home to the hold-
er certainly entitles the state to some degree of taxing power, the "taxing" of
all unclaimed property for which creditor records do not exist is in no way
related to the intrastate activities of the holder.61 Thus, the unclaimed prop-
erty collection would fail the tax statute due process analysis.
Of course, this particular problem could be overcome should the Su-
preme Court exchange the priority rules for a division of unclaimed property
56. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978); Am. Oil Co. v. Neil, 380
U.S. 451, 458 (1965); see also PAUL J. HARTMAN & CHARLES A. TROST, FEDERAL LIMITA-
TIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION (2d ed. 2010) § 2:3 ("When a State projects its taxing
power beyond its borders and fastens its tax talons upon values having no factual connection
with a transaction in the taxing State, it confers nothing in return for the exaction. And. . . the
taxing statute offends due process requirements.").
57. Wolfe, supra note 54, at 236; see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989)
("The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the reve-
nues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the
activity being taxed."); Nat'l Leather Co. v. Massachusetts, 277 U.S. 413, 423 (1928).
58. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1993); Pennsylvania v. New York,
407 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1972); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 681-82 (1965).
59. The location of a corporation is presumed to be the state in which it is incorporated
and is not determined by a factual inquiry into where its "principal offices are located." Dela-
ware, 507 U.S. at 506 ("As in Texas, we find that determining the State of incorporation is the
most efficient way to locate a corporate debtor. Exclusive reliance on incorporation permits
the disposition of claims under the secondary rule upon the taking of judicial notice.").
60. See id. at 499.
61. This assumes that the holder conducts business across state lines.
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more in line with traditional tax apportionment considerations.62 The Court,
however, has refused to alter its jurisdictional guidelines on several occa-
sions.63 Additionally, if viewed as taxes, escheat statutes would have to con-
conform to other constitutional limitations on state taxation, including the
restrictions imposed by the Commerce Clause.64
Moreover, justifying unclaimed property laws by their ability to generate
revenue is inconsistent with the typical understanding of modem escheat as
a device intended to protect missing owners.65 Though many observers have
noted that these laws serve dual policy objectives, 66 their primary purpose is
to assist in reunification; the financial benefit represents only a secondary
goal. 67 For the reasons discussed in Part IV, courts confronting substantive
due process challenges to unclaimed property laws may assert that they are,
in fact, rationally related to their primary objective of reunification. Given
this ability, it makes little sense for a court to rest its decision upon the trou-
bling view that these statutes are chiefly intended to raise revenue. Judicial
recognition that a law is intended to facilitate one governmental interest
when the statute was in essence "sold" to the public on entirely different
grounds can only undermine public confidence and trust in the legislative
process.
68
The uncertainty created by bluring the line between escheat and taxa-
tion and the general inconsistency of viewing unclaimed property laws as
primarily motivated by revenue suggest that courts upholding aggressive
escheat laws should do so under another rationale. Possible alternatives in-
62. At least one commenter has urged precisely this, arguing that the current priority
rules cannot "equitably resolve competing state claims to abandoned property that is not clear-
ly located within one state." Wolfe, supra note 54, at 174.
63. See, e.g., Delaware, 507 U.S. at 509 ("[In Pennsylvania, we expressly refused to
'vary the application of the [primary] rule according to the adequacy of the debtor's records.'
And we decline to do so here." (quoting Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 215
(1972))).
64. HARTMAN & TROST, supra note 56, § 2:3 ("[Iln order for the tax craft to reach the
harbor of constitutionality, it must sail safely past the Scylla of the commerce clause and the
Charybdis of due process.").
65. See What is Unclaimed Property?, supra note 6 ("Unclaimed property is one of the
original consumer protection programs.").
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. For example, Millar and Coalson state as follows:
[SItate unclaimed property laws are primarily designed as procedural mechanisms that
facilitate the return of unclaimed property to its owner.
A number of courts have also held that these laws have a secondary objective as well-to
give the state, rather than the holder of the unclaimed property, the benefit of the use of
the property until the owner reclaims it ....
Millar & Coalson, supra note 36, at 517.
68. See John Martinez, Rational Legislating, 34 STETSON L. REv. 547, 550, 552-55
(2005) (noting that public distrust of state legislatures is worsening and suggesting that the
problem is best addressed through "rational legislating" measures that "clearly set[] out the
analytic connection between the problems legislators seek to address and the enactments
passed to address them" (emphasis omitted)).
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clude either showing that the holder lacks a property interest in the un-
claimed funds and thus may not even bring an initial due process challenge
or demonstrating that the legislation is rationally related to some other legit-
imate government interest, like the reunification of owners with their
abandoned property.
III. THE PROPERTY INTEREST JUSTIFICATION PROBLEM
Courts faced with revenue-raising escheat statutes may consider the es-
tablished test, which asks first whether a protected property interest exists
and then "whether 'the deprivation of that interest contravene[s] the notions
of due process.' "69 Looking to the first prong of this analysis, a court could
rest its endorsement of an unclaimed property law on the theory that holders
simply have no property interest in the disputed funds (the "property interest
justification"). While more satisfying than a justification based on the reve-
nue-raising nature of these statutes or a broad assertion of escheat's
constitutionality, such a maneuver would have limited utility, since its appli-
cation would be restricted to those revenue-raising escheat statutes that do
not operate to shorten dormancy periods.70 Moreover, some circuits have
held that a plaintiff must show a property interest only when attacking "dis-
cretionary conduct of government officials" and not when challenging an
actual state law.7' If this is indeed the case, the property interest justification
would lose what little utility it does have, as holders simply would not be
required to demonstrate the deprivation of a property interest.
Let us assume, however, that in order for a holder to assert a Fourteenth
Amendment claim alleging that it has been deprived of its property without
due process of law it must first show that it actually had an interest in the
property.72 States could conceivably argue that holders, by virtue of their
status as debtors and not actual owners, do not possess such an interest. 73
69. Am. Express 1, 630 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (quoting Wojcik v. City of
Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001)).
70. See infra Section III.C. For the purposes of this Note, these are laws authorizing the
use of extrapolation to assess unclaimed property liability.
71. E.g., Am. Express II1, 641 F.3d 685, 688-89 (6th Cir. 2011). But see Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 888-89 (2000) ("After
College Savings Bank, one thing seems reasonably clear: Parties seeking to protect an eco-
nomic interest under the Due Process or Takings Clauses, whether advancing a procedural or a
substantive claim, must be prepared to demonstrate that their interest is 'property.' ").
72. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673, 675 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff had no property interest in "freedom from a
competitor's false advertising" and thus prophylactic federal legislation could not protect this
interest under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d
600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Procedural and substantive due process claims are examined under
a two-part analysis. First, the Court must determine whether the interest at stake is a protected
liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Merrill, supra note 71, at
888-89.
73. Such an argument would not be frivolous; the American Express I court expressly
considered this threshold issue and found that American Express had a property interest, Am.
Express 1, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61 (looking to state law to determine what
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Unfortunately, it is unclear when property exists for the purposes of substan-
tive due process.7 4 There are at least three possibilities regarding what
constitutes such an interest: (1) that property is created by nonconstitutional
sources such as state law (the "Roth theory"); 75 (2) that property is defined
by the right to exclude others (the "College Savings theory");76 and (3) that
nonconstitutional sources of law establish what rights an entity has and fed-
eral law then determines whether those rights represent property (the
"patterning theory"). 77 This Part briefly discusses each theory and concludes
that several of the holder-owner relationships that most often give rise to
unclaimed property liability 78 represent circumstances in which the holder in
fact has a cognizable property interest under any of the three frameworks.
A. Three Property Interest Theories
One theory of how to define a property interest was articulated in Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth.7 9 The Supreme Court, reviewing a pro-
cedural due process claim and determining that the nonrenewal of an
untenured professor's contract was not a deprivation of property, described
the creation of property interests as follows:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-
constituted a property interest), but the Sidamon-Eristoff court addressed the same question
under the Takings Clause and found that American Express did not have a property interest,
Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 586-87
(D.N.J. 2010) (also looking to state law to determine what constituted a property interest).
Though what represents a property interest for substantive due process purposes is not neces-
sarily the same as for takings purposes, e.g., Merrill, supra note 71, at 958, the Sidamon-
Eristoff court actually seemed to apply the same test as in American Express I and suggested
that the American Express I court was incorrect in finding a substantive due process property
interest. See Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 586-87.
74. Merrill, supra note 71, at 889. One commentator has noted that the Supreme
Court's pronouncements have been "seemingly inconsistent" and are "to put it mildly, likely to
produce bewilderment among lower courts and practicing lawyers." Id. at 889-90.
75. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text. See Merrill, supra note 71, for a far
more thorough discussion of what may constitute a property interest.
78. This Part specifically addresses bank accounts and uncashed checks. See, e.g., Un-
claimed Property, PA. TREASURY, http://www.patreasury.org/unclaimedProperty.htm (last
visited July 21, 2011) (recognizing "savings or checking accounts" and "checks that have not
been cashed" as two of the most common types of unclaimed property); Unclaimed Property
Main Page, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER'S OFFICE, http://www.sco.ca.gov/upd.htm (last visited
July 21, 2011) (recognizing "[blank accounts" as one of the most common types of unclaimed
property).
79. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims
of entitlement to those benefits.8"
This positive law approach has been cited favorably in subsequent cases,8
including one of the Court's major unclaimed property decisions.82
The second theory, provided by College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,3 diverges from the Roth
standard significantly. In finding that a plaintiff had no property interest in
"freedom from a competitor's false advertising," 84 the Court declared that
"[tihe hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude oth-
ers."85 This could be understood as a departure from the positivist approach
of Roth and the related theory, discussed below, which simply attaches ele-
ments to that foundational standard.8 6
The third theory, prominently displayed in Drye v. United States,87 pro-
vides that courts should "look initially to state law to determine what rights
the [party] has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to feder-
al law to determine whether the [party's] state-delineated rights qualify as
'property' or 'rights to property.' "88 This can be viewed as a qualified Roth
standard-rather than relying exclusively on nonconstitutional sources of
law to define property, those independent foundations would be used only to
determine whether an interest exists and then federal law would control
80. Roth, 408 U.S. at 566-69, 577.
81. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 n.I (1981).
82. Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1993) (applying the standard to
determine which entity was properly understood as the "debtor" but not to determine whether
the holder has due process property rights).
83. 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
84. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673.
85. Id.
86. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 887-89. Indeed, College Savings seems to represent a
narrowing of the field protected by substantive due process. See id. at 987 ("The basic prob-
lem with College Savings Bank's right-to-exclude criterion in the context of substantive due
process is that it takes the intuitive core of takings property-property-as-ownership--and
seeks to transpose it to a doctrine that historically has performed a much broader function.")
Professor Merrill acknowledges that his own theory, the product of an attempt to reconcile the
conflicting caselaw, is not able to fully account for the "right to exclude" language and can
only embrace College Savings to the extent that it would have reached the same result. See id.
at 986-91, 998.
87. 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
88. Drye, 528 U.S. at 58. In fact this two-step analysis is on display or implicitly
acknowledged in a number of the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonza-
les, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005) (even if Colorado law created an entitlement, "it is by no means
clear that [the entitlement at issue] could constitute a 'property' interest for purposes of the
Due Process Clause."); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) ("Alt-
hough the underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such as state
law,' federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legiti-
mate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause." (quoting Bd. of Regents of
State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))). One commentator refers to this as the "'pat-
terning definition' approach to constitutional property." Merrill, supra note 71, at 927, and this
Note refers to it as the patterning theory.
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whether that interest is "property."89 It is unclear, however, precisely which
federal law should be applied in this second step. 90 At least for the federal
tax lien statute, this latter determination turned on the ability of the deprived
party to "chahnel" the property;91 in other cases, the Court has emphasized
the existence of monetary value92 and the ability to exclude.93
B. Common Holder-Owner Relationships Create a
Property Interest for the Holder
Though the precise test for assessing what represents a constitutional
property interest is unclear, it appears that a holder of unclaimed property
will often have such an interest under any of these three possibilities. Two of
the most common situations that create unclaimed property are when a party
issues a check that a payee fails to cash and when a party deposits funds
with a financial institution that he later fails to withdraw.94 Applying each of
the three tests described above to these two contexts suggests that a holder
will often have a cognizable property interest for the purposes of substantive
due process.
Under the Roth theory, the appropriate inquiry is whether nonconstitu-
tional sources create the interest. Various courts, interpreting state law, have
noted that a deposit with a bank not only creates a debtor-creditor obligation
that must be honored but also passes full ownership of the funds to the
bank.95 Travelers checks, such as those at issue in the American Express
decisions, can be viewed as creating a similar relationship: the purchase of
the check functions as a deposit of that check's value with the issuing entity,
and that entity may then be called upon as a debtor to repay the deposited
amount.
96
89. Merrill, supra note 71, at 927 ("Federal constitutional law prescribes the set of
criteria an interest must have to qualify as property; whether the claimant has an interest that
fits the pattern is then determined by examining independent sources such as state law.").
90. See Merrill, supra note 71, at 954 ("The problem with the patterning-definition
strategy is that it requires courts to commit to general federal constitutional criteria for the
identification of property interests. There is remarkably little useful law to assist in this en-
deavor.").
91. Drye, 528 U.S. at 61.
92. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766. See also Merrill, supra note 71, at 987.
93. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 78.
95. See, e.g., Lee v. Bank of Am., 267 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Scog-
gan v. Dillon, 252 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Ky. 1952); Kings Premium Serv. Corp. v. Mfrs. Hanover
Trust Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp.
v. Am. Fin. Mortg. Corp., 855 A.2d 818, 824 n.12 (Pa. 2004); see also Am. Express 1, 630 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 761 (E.D. Ky. 2009) ("A deposit becomes a part of the banks own funds. The
bank then retains an interest in those funds until the money is claimed by the creditor.").
96. Am. Express 1, 630 F Supp. 2d at 761. Indeed, this is precisely the reasoning that
allowed the American Express I court to discover a property interest, push forward, and con-
sider the second prong of the due process analysis. Id. at 760-61.
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Even should a court view escheat not as the seizure of deposited funds
but only as the assumption of intangible debt or the depositor's contractual
right to repayment,9 7 a bank-holder will still be able to demonstrate a prop-
erty interest in its own contractual right to earn a profit from the deposited
funds.98 So, under the foundational Roth analysis, the parties holding un-
claimed property via a banking or quasi-banking relationship will be able to
assert a substantive due process property interest.
The conclusion is the same for escheatable property arising out of un-
cashed checks. When one party presents a check to another, he does not
immediately surrender ownership of the promised funds but rather maintains
his interest in those funds until the drawee bank actually honors the order.99
While one must look to state law in applying the Roth test, the Supreme
Court has turned to Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted by
all 50 states,1° ° and found that under this "state law" no property interest is
transferred until a check is honored."'
The College Savings theory asks whether the claimant had a right to ex-
clude others from the supposed property. While a bank-holder must
acquiesce to a depositor's wishes regarding the disbursement of funds, it
need only pay the debt from its own reserves and is not required to return
the funds that were actually deposited. 0 2 Rather, the bank takes full title to,
and thus may exclude all others from, the deposited funds themselves. 103
Should a court reject this reasoning by viewing escheat as the assumption of
97. Courts may view escheat as the seizure of an owner's contractual right to payment
rather than the seizure of the deposited funds themselves. See Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett,
321 U.S. 233, 241 (1944) (understanding the unclaimed "deposits" to be "debtor obligations
of the bank" and not the funds themselves). But see Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 502
(1993) (noting that the abandoned "[mlunds held by a debtor" are what "become subject to
escheat" but then going on to affirm that "'deposits are debtor obligations'" (first emphasis
added) (quoting Anderson Nat'l Bank, 321 U.S. at 241)). If this is the case, the fact that the
bank acquires title to the actual money is of no consequence-the escheated property is not
that tangible money.
98. Bank-holders have an implicit interest and contract right in generating profits from
deposited funds. See State Tax Comm'n v. Yavapai Cnty. Sav. Bank, 81 P.2d 86, 88 (Ariz.
1938). This ability to utilize the funds, like all contractual benefits, represents a "specific enti-
tlement[]," 17A Am. JUR. 2d Contracts § 1 (2010), and thus rises above the "abstract need[s]
or desire[s]" and "unilateral expectation[s]" rejected in Roth. Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (noting that the claimant did have a property interest in his
contractually guaranteed employment up until the specified termination date).
99. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 396-400 (1992) (holding that a transfer does
not occur under the Bankruptcy Code until the drawee bank honors a check, where a "trans-
fer" is defined as the "parting with property or with an interest in property" (quoting 1 U.S.C.
§ 101(54) (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. Id. at 398 n.5 ("New Mexico, the State in which the instant transaction occurred,
has adopted the U.C.C. as have all other 49 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands." (internal citation omitted)).
101. See id. at 397-99.
102. See, e.g., Kings Premium Serv. Corp. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d
524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
103. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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a depositor's right to repayment, a bank may again frame its own right to
generate profits from the deposits as the relevant property interest. ° 4 The
bank may exclude even the depositor from this contractual right.
Likewise, in the common situation of an uncashed check, the holder will
have a property interest under the College Savings theory. Since the issuer of
the check does not cede his interest in the funds to be transferred until the
drawee bank actually honors the check, there is no reason to believe that his
general right to exclude has been impaired before that point.
Finally, the interests created in these two contexts would also constitute
"property" under the patterning theory, which begins from the Roth standard
and then inquires "whether the [party's] state-delineated rights qualify as
'property' or 'rights to property' " under federal law.105 For the reasons
discussed above, the threshold component of this test-the nonconstitutional
interest-will be present.10 6 With regard to the second hurdle, the unclaimed
funds at issue in the cases of an uncashed check or a forgotten bank account
will clearly possess monetary value, and, in either scenario, the holder will
be able to "channel" the money.10 7 Likewise, the holder will be able to ex-
clude others from this interest.1
0 8
Thus, in two of the most common unclaimed property contexts-where
a creditor fails to collect his deposit from a financial institution and when he
fails to cash a check-the holding entity would actually have a recognized
property interest, and the due process inquiry may proceed."° A reviewing
court would be unable to employ a property interest justification in such
situations.
C. A Holder's Property Interest in Unclaimed Property is
Extinguished upon Abandonment
Courts may, however, be able to use the property interest justification to
endorse a subset of revenue-raising escheat statutes-namely, categories of
unclaimed property laws apart from those shortening dormancy periods."0
The Supreme Court has stated that a banking institution's property interest
in deposited funds is extinguished when those funds become abandoned, or,
104. See supra note 96-98 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
107. Deposited funds "belong to the bank, become part of its general funds, and can be
loaned by it as other moneys." Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 301 (1905) (quoting
Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 77 U.S. 152, 155 (1869)). In this way, the bank "exercises
dominion over" the deposited funds and "determines who will receive the property." Drye v.
United States, 528 U.S. 49, 51 (1999).
108. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
109. See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2001).
110. Again, for the purposes of this Note, this subset is limited to laws authorizing the
use of estimation to determine unclaimed property liability. See supra note 15.
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in other words, when the dormancy period has elapsed."' Assuming that this
reasoning may be extended to other forms of unclaimed property,"2 escheat
statutes that affect only property already deemed abandoned will be shielded
from holder-initiated due process attacks." 3 A court may dismiss due pro-
cess challenges to laws authorizing states to extrapolate a holder's
unclaimed property liability because the extrapolation provides an estimate
of only that unclaimed property that has already been deemed abandoned
and therefore only those funds in which the holder no longer has a property
interest.
On the other hand, courts will not be able to extend this justification to
those statutes shortening dormancy periods, as the very act of reducing the
dormancy period accelerates the date of abandonment. Here, a property in-
terest justification would face a circularity problem; a holder would be
unable to challenge the escheat statute due solely to the implications of the
statute itself. Such a situation would be akin to a state passing a law denying
an individual access to the courts and then refusing to hear his challenge on
account of that very law.
Finally, it is worth noting once more that even the little work the proper-
ty interest justification might do in supporting those laws that authorize
extrapolation would be erased if a holder-plaintiff challenging an actual
statute-as opposed to discretionary government conduct-need only show
arbitrary and capricious action. This conclusion would eliminate the proper-
ty interest requirement entirely and further reduce a reviewing court's
options for upholding the constitutionality of these statutes.
IV. THE REUNIFICATION ANSWER
Though a court facing an aggressive escheat law typically may not dis-
miss a Fourteenth Amendment claim under the property interest
justification,"' government interference with property rights nevertheless
satisfies due process so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state
111. See, e.g., Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 502 (1993) ("[A] law requiring the
delivery of [abandoned] deposits to the State affects no property interest belonging to the
bank" (citing Sec. Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282, 285-86 (1923))); see also Am. Ex-
press 1, 630 F. Supp. 2d. 757, 761 (E.D. Ky. 2009) ("A bank's property interest in funds from
travelers checks is extinguished when the customer uses the travelers check or when the state's
presumptive abandonment period begins.").
112. This seems to be a fair assumption. Justice Thomas's statements about a bank lack-
ing property interest in abandoned funds followed and was intended as an illustration of his
more general point that "[f]unds held by a debtor become subject to escheat because the debt-
or has no interest in the funds." Delaware, 507 U.S. at 502.
113. With their property interest having expired, the holders will not be able raise a due
process challenge. See Wojcik, 257 F.3d at 609 ("Only after identifying [a property interest at
stake] do we continue to consider whether the deprivation of that interest contravened the
notions of due process.").
114. See supra Part III.
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interest." 5 Though the connection to reunification is not always obvious, a
court confronting questionable categories of escheat laws should endorse
them as bearing some direct and logical relation to the concededly legiti-
mate aim of returning abandoned property to its true owners. The
relationships between these revenue-raising statutes and reunification are
found in (1) the financial security offered by placing unclaimed funds in
states' hands (the "financial security connection"), (2) the earlier notifica-
tion required by shortened dormancy periods (the "early notification
connection"), (3) the benefits of collecting property in the custody of a
common holder (the "common holder connection"), and (4) the effect of
incentivizing holder record-keeping (the "record-keeping connection"). This
Part explores each of these connections in turn, explaining why and how a
reviewing court should conclude that both laws shortening dormancy peri-
ods and those authorizing the extrapolation of unclaimed property liability
do, in fact, satisfy the requirements of due process. 16
A. The Financial Security Connection
The relative financial security of states compared to private holders sug-
gests that both shortened dormancy periods and statutes allowing for the
estimation of unclaimed property liability ultimately serve to reunite owners
with their abandoned property. This financial well-being is a product of the
inability of states to enter bankruptcy as well as the potential for government
oversight to minimize debtor mismanagement of owed funds.
States, unlike private holders, are unable to declare bankruptcy." 7 This
inability protects owners whose property rests in state hands from the inher-
ent uncertainty of the bankruptcy context, in which debtors may discharge
debts and face competing creditor claims." 18 While owners may file a claim
for abandoned property that has become part of a bankruptcy estate, such
efforts by no means assure these owner-creditors of complete recovery."19
115. Am. Express 1, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 762; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
116. Out of the two categories of unclaimed property laws considered by this Note, the
early notification, common holder, and record-keeping connections only apply to and justify
those statutes shortening dormancy periods. See infra Sections IV.B-D. The financial security
connection, however, demonstrates that both categories are logically consistent with reunifica-
tion. See infra Section IV.A.
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006); see also Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for
States to Escape Their Debt Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at Al ("[S]tates are barred
from seeking protection in federal bankruptcy court. Any effort to change that status would
have to clear high constitutional hurdles ... "). The risk of creditor injury is also present in
the federal receivership context, see Gilchrist v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 262 F3d 295, 304
(4th Cir. 2001); L.A. Trust Deed & Mortg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 E2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960),
but no state has ever been put into receivership, Christopher Beam, Can California Declare
Bankruptcy?, SLATE (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.slate.comid/2246915/.
118. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507,524.
119. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010) ("Many bankruptcy cases do not generate sufficient proceeds to pay in
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Furthermore, the ability of a state to intervene and protect the silent interest
of the true owners is limited in bankruptcy proceedings. Most courts consid-
ering this issue have determined that an escheating state cannot participate
as a claimant unless the property at issue was deemed abandoned before the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.12 0 At least one court, however,
has denied that a state may ever particiate in such proceedings.' 2' Given this
uncertainty, the true owner of the property would benefit by having it placed
in the hands of an entity incapable of entering bankruptcy.
Setting aside the unpredictability when a holder is in bankruptcy, state
escheat provides some financial security by erasing the risk of property be-
ing squandered by a private holder before bankruptcy proceedings are even
initiated. While the Bankruptcy Code guards against fraudulent transfers
made within two years of a bankruptcy petition,12 it does not prevent a
debtor from misusing the resources in its possession prior to this clawback
period. 23 The limited clawback period leaves creditors, including the
owners of unclaimed property, vulnerable. 124 The American legal system
recognizes the risk of debtor mismanagement in other areas and has protect-
ed creditor interests by subjecting at-risk property to various forms of
governmental oversight or control. 25 Unclaimed property law can be viewed
as another method by which states can assume such a guardianship role.
While revenue-driven escheat practices may not have an obvious effect on
the amount of unclaimed property returned to its true owners, they
ultimately help to accomplish this goal by transferring the funds to safer
hands.
full all claims entitled to payment in the case."); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 789 (1987) ("By definition, the distributional issues arising in bankruptcy
involve costs to some and benefits to others.").
120. See, e.g., In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 161 B.R. 101, 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993); In re
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 151 B.R. 684, 688-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
121. In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 5 B.R. 620, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that
Pennsylvania did "not acquire any interest in escheated property which would allow it to file a
proof of claim therefor" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1989).
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
123. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 119, 548.03[l] (noting, however, that cer-
tain transfers may still be vulnerable under longer state law reachback periods).
124. See id. 548.01 [1][a] ("Section 548 and fraudulent transfer law generally attempt
to protect creditors from transactions which are designed, or have the effect, of unfairly drain-
ing the pool of assets available to satisfy creditors' claims....").
125. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006) (authorizing the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to act as a conservator or receiver for certain classes of struggling insured deposi-
tory institutions); 13 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 66.03[2]-[3] (3d ed. 1997) (discussing
the practice of appointing federal equity receivers, which are officers of the court, to protect
property of claimants, owners, creditors, and the public generally); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra, § 53.10[3][d] (explaining that a master may be appointed to take custody of
and administer the distribution of awarded funds).
November 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
The financial security benefit is clearly applicable in assessing the pro-
priety of escheat statutes that shorten dormancy periods,126 but the
government interest in reuniting owners with their unclaimed property is not
so clearly served by questionable laws that allow for estimation in determin-
ing escheat liability. After all, the use of extrapolation is itself justified by
the holder's lack of creditor records, and, without such records, the true
owners of the seized property cannot be identified.' One might contend
that if the owners cannot be found, the property cannot be remitted, and the
government interest in reunification cannot be served. It would make no
difference that the funds are entrusted to the safe hands of the state if the
state is protecting them for nobody but itself.
The fallacy of this argument is the assumption that creditors may be
identified only through a holder's records. In some cases, the missing credi-
tor will also possess a sufficient record of the transaction. 12 The use of
extrapolation places an amount of a holder's property, approximately equiv-
alent to the value of the unclaimed property it owes, in the secure custody of
the state to await the emergence of the true owners.
B. The Early Notification Connection
While the financial security connection suggests that both types of reve-
nue-raising statutes discussed by this Note are logically related to
reunification, several additional connections further link reductions in dor-
mancy periods to this government objective. The first of these is the early
notification connection.
Statutes reducing dormancy periods assist in reunification by ensuring
that attempts to contact owners are made sooner, when it is more likely that
an owner will be found at the address listed in a holder's records. Quicker
turnover to a state has actually been shown to result in the return of a sub-
stantially higher percentage of unclaimed property.129 This phenomenon is
likely due to population mobility, which makes it increasingly difficult to
126. The shortening of dormancy periods inevitably shifts some amount of unclaimed
property to state governments that previously would have been retained by private holders. In
other words, such statutes increase state unclaimed property holdings while decreasing private
holdings. The relatively greater security of government custody increases the chances of reuni-
fication, since the first step in returning property is having the property to return. Thus,
shortened dormancy periods, simply by transferring unclaimed property from private to public
hands, support reunification. The Uniform Law Commission actually noted this benefit in its
summary of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act of 1995. Unclaimed Property Act Summary,
UNw. LAW COMM'N, http://www.nccusl.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Unclaimed%20Property
%20Act (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
127. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
128. For example, an uncashed travelers check would remain in the owner's possession
and would demonstrate both his ownership and, through the absence of a countersignature,
that he had not previously recovered the deposit from the holder. See 9 C.J.S. Banks and Bank-
ing § 484 (2011).
129. Harris & Shambaugh, supra note 26, at 54 (citing UNIF. UNCLAIMED PRop. ACT
(1981) § 2 & cmt., 8C U.L.A. 186 (2001)).
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contact owners as years pass. 130 The underlying rationale suggests that not
only will quicker escheat aid in reunification but also so will any means of
ensuring earlier notification attempts, since such efforts are more likely to
find an owner at his record address.
Shortened dormancy periods actually aid reunification by encouraging
quicker notification in two related ways. First, states actively seek to contact
owners soon after escheat."' Though, like private holders, government ac-
tors often have an incentive to retain unclaimed property for as long as
possible,132 many states work to achieve reunification through the publica-
tion of owner names in electronic databases, outreach at public events, and
various other means. 133 Importantly, and in contrast to private holders, 134
states are generally required to begin notification measures soon after taking
custody of escheated funds. 135 Put simply, a shortened dormancy period re-
sults in quicker escheat, which in turn mandates earlier state attempts to
contact the true owners. These earlier efforts will result in more effective
notification, as "the missing owner's trail" will be "warmer."' 136 Thus, reduc-
ing dormancy periods increases the odds of reunification.
However, the connection between shortened dormancy periods and reu-
nification does not rest solely on a state's responsibility to engage in prompt
creditor notification. It is further bolstered by the fact that private holders
are generally required to contact the apparent owner before turning over the
unclaimed property to the state. 137 Shortened abandonment presumptions
130. See id.; Lynden Lyman, Why Is There So Much Unclaimed Property, Anyway?,
EMERGING IssuEs, May 2008, available at 2008 Emerging Issues 2280, at *3 (LEXIS) ("For
instance, a state with a three-year abandonment period will find more missing owners than a
state with a five-year timeframe, simply because the shorter the period, the warmer the miss-
ing owner's trail.").
131. See, e.g., UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995) § 9(a), 8C U.L.A. 120 (2001) ("The
administrator shall publish a notice not later than November 30 of the year next following the
year in which abandoned property has been paid or delivered to the administrator.").
132. See, e.g., JANA S. LESLIE, THE BEST AND WORST OF STATE UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
LAWS 8-15 (2009), available at http://www.cost.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id
=71960 (revealing in table form that seventeen states do not remit any of the interest earned on
unclaimed property to a recovering owner).
133. What is Unclaimed Property?, supra note 6 (noting that state officials "have devel-
oped many powerful and effective methods to locate owners including the use of websites,
cross-checking public data, staging thousands of awareness events at state fairs and even
shopping malls, and developing a national database"). In fact, all states, including the seven-
teen that, as of January 2009, did not remit interest earned on unclaimed property and thus had
the greatest incentive to retain such property for as long as possible, see LESLIE, supra note
132, at 8-15, provide access to a free state database of unclaimed property or direct potential
claimants to a free national database. Jennifer Waters, How to Claim Billions in Cash Just
Waiting for You, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-to-
find-unclaimed-property-funds-2011-02-10.
134. See UNIF. UNCLAIMED PRop. ACT § 7(e), 8C U.L.A. 117 (requiring only that hold-
ers contact the apparent owner 120 to 60 days before filing a report with the escheating state).
135. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 9(a), 8C U.L.A. 120.
136. See Lyman, supra note 130, at *3.
137. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 7(e), 8C U.L.A. 117.
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accelerate the notification provided to owners by both states and private
holders.'38
C. The Common Holder Connection
As noted above, shortened dormancy periods increase the amount of un-
claimed property being held by states and decrease the amount held by
private debtors. 39 Thus, if it could be shown that placing more abandoned
property in government hands increases the chances of reunification, the
dormancy statutes would reach a legitimate state interest. It is logically con-
sistent to believe that placing large amounts of unclaimed property in the
hands of a common holder-the government--does help to bring about reu-
nification: if a state holds more unclaimed property, a potential owner has
more incentive to check that state's records to see if his own property is be-
ing held.
States pursue reunification in a number of ways, 140 but perhaps the most
common is the use of searchable electronic databases containing the names
of abandoned property owners. 14' These databases provide a low-cost means
by which claimants may identify their forgotten or previously undiscovered
property, and the benefit of such a search is potentially quite high. The pos-
sibility of realizing a benefit only rises as the amount of unclaimed property
held by a state increases; more money in a state's unclaimed property hold-
ings means a greater likelihood that any given claimant will locate his own
abandoned property through a search of those holdings. Assuming that the
owners of unclaimed property act rationally and become more likely to en-
gage in a particular act when its benefit-cost ratio increases, placing more
unclaimed property in state custody should incentivize owners to utilize
electronic databases and other state resources.
On the other hand, it is doubtful that similarly increasing the amount of
unclaimed property held by private debtors would likewise encourage own-
ers to seek it out; the difference is cost. While states provide a low-cost
means of locating abandoned funds by gathering them in the hands of a cen-
tral actor, private holders are dispersed. The cost to an owner of seeking
reunification from individual private debtors includes retaining and organiz-
ing the records necessary to show which entity is holding the property as
well as contacting and filing claims with each separate holder. As the bene-
fits rise, the costs increase as well.
138. Of course, the prevention of abandonment is somewhat different than "reunifica-
tion' but both arrive at the same result---ensuring that property ends up in the possession of
its true owner.
139. See supra note 126.
140. See supra note 133.
141. See Waters, supra note 133.
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D. The Record-Keeping Connection
Finally, at least as it relates to property for which the presumption of
abandonment is tied to a loss of contact with the owner, shortened dormancy
periods may incentivize greater holder-creditor contact. This, in turn, is like-
ly to lead to more frequent reunification.
Since holders often derive some benefit from the retention of unclaimed
property,142 they have an incentive to prevent the dormancy period from run-
ning. Generally, this may be accomplished through some form of contact
with the owner."' Thus, as holders are threatened with shorter dormancy
periods, they may act to keep more thorough creditor records and maintain
the minimal level of contact with these owners sufficient to ward off the pre-
sumption of abandonment. The retention of creditor records will ultimately
result in more efficient notification of owners whether by the state or by the
holder itself, and the increased contact may prevent the property from ever
becoming truly abandoned in the first place. 14'
For example, under Delaware law, most categories of property are
deemed abandoned when a full dormancy period has passed, and this period
only runs when the "owner has ceased, failed or neglected to exercise do-
minion or control ... or to assert a right of ownership or possession or to
make presentment and demand for payment and satisfaction or to do any
other action in relation to or concerning such property."'145 A Delaware cor-
poration that issues gift certificates will want to maintain contact
information for its purchasers so that, when the five year dormancy period is
about to expire,146 it can reinitiate communication with the owners, thereby
resetting the clock. While a purchaser might respond by claiming his prop-
erty from the corporation, this result simply leaves the holder in the same
position as if it had turned over the funds to the State of Delaware. On the
other hand, the owner may prefer to leave his property in the form of gift
certificates or otherwise neglect to redeem them, and the corporation would
142. See, e.g., Am. Express 1, 630 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (E.D. Ky. 2009) ("American
Express does not charge a fee for issuing travelers checks to its customers. The ability to offer
this service gratis derives from profits earned on the travelers check funds"). Indeed, holders
will often have a recognized property interest in the unclaimed property. See supra Part 111B.
143. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1198(9)(a) (2007 & Supp. 2010) (" 'Period of
dormancy' means the full and continuous period.., during which an owner has ceased, failed
or neglected ... to do any ... act in relation to or concerning such property."); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 393.060(2) (West 2010) (presuming abandonment for sums payable on written instru-
ments "unless the owner has ... corresponded in writing with the banking or financial
organization" within the designated dormancy period); UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT (1995)
§ 2(c), 8C U.L.A. 104 (2001) ("Property is unclaimed if for the applicable period ... the ap-
parent owner has not communicated in writing ... with the holder concerning the property... ).
144. Again, the prevention of abandonment is not precisely "reunification," but both
operate to place property in the hands of its true owner. See supra note 138.
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1198(9)(a).
146. For gift certificates, the dormancy period is actually the shorter of five years or the
certificate's expiration period less one day. Id. § 1198(9)(b)(1)-(2).
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continue to profit from these accounts. If the former sequence occurs, the
owner never loses the money that he placed in the gift certificates; if the
latter sequence occurs and the certificates are eventually abandoned, some
record of the owner's address exists for future notification. In either scenar-
io, the shortened dormancy period has supported the goal of reunification. 147
While the relationship between revenue-raising escheat statutes and reu-
nification may not be immediately apparent, the four connections discussed
above should allow these laws to satisfy a holder-initiated due process chal-
lenge.148 Both statutes reducing dormancy periods and those allowing
estimation of unclaimed property liability increase the financial security of
owner-creditors. 149 The former category further supports reunification by
increasing the chances that owners are contacted before their trails go
cold,1 51 incentivizing owner efforts to locate their own abandoned proper-
ty1 51 and encouraging holders to maintain more thorough records.152
CONCLUSION
The American Express III court arrived at the proper outcome in uphold-
ing a revenue-raising unclaimed property law, but reached its conclusion in
a fashion that was unclear and inconsistent with the general understanding
of modem escheat as a consumer-protection device. The better approach is
to recognize that even aggressive escheat legislation ultimately benefits
missing owners. Though the relationship between revenue-raising laws and
the reunification of owners with their abandoned property may be complex,
it certainly does exist.
Ultimately, the recognition that aggressive escheat statutes conform to
the requirements of due process is consistent with both logic and the
147. Of course, this incentive will only exist for the holder to the extent that the value of
maintaining the property saved from escheat by the latter sequence exceeds the administrative
costs of initiating the preemptive contact. This value is likely to depend on the type of proper-
ty in question. For example, it would not seem strange that an owner of a dormant bank
deposit actually intended to leave it untouched and would want it to remain in the hands of the
bank. Thus, it may make sense for a bank to incur the costs associated with keeping better
owner records and contacting those owners before the earlier presumption of abandonment-it
could reasonably anticipate that many "missing" owners would actually prefer to leave their
deposits untouched, giving the benefit of those funds to the bank in the interim. On the other
hand, it is unlikely that an employee would have intentionally delayed the deposit of a payroll
check and, upon being contacted, would ask that his employer continue to hold those funds.
Thus, whether this record-keeping incentive would actually exist may well depend on the
holder's specific industry, and such inquiries are beyond the scope of this Note.
148. A court must ask whether "there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). Here, the four connections demon-
strate that the considered escheat statutes were rational means of correcting the "evil" of
incomplete reunification.
149. See supra Section IV.A.
150. See supra Section IV.B.
151. See supra Section IV.C.
152. See supra Section IV.D.
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acknowledged policy objectives of modem escheat.'53 These laws help to
reunite owners with their abandoned property and, in the interim, allow the
public at large to enjoy the use of the missing funds. Given the amount of
money at stake, judicial recognition of these statutes' validity should pro-
vide comfort to both groups. Perhaps more importantly, affirming their
constitutionality under the proper rationale will provide certainty and en-
courage trust in the legislative process.
153. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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